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A New International Role for Small(er) States?

Abstracts

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GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT AS A BASIS OF ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY OF SMALL EUROPEAN STATES – THE CASE OF AUSTRIA AND SLOVENIA REGARDING THE WESTERN BALKANS

Traditional strategies of small states' influence in the international community focus on neutrality, conflict avoiding behaviour, bargaining, mediation and avoiding big risks or costs. Strategies identified after the end of cold war try to include the new globalized conditions of international environment and expose new factors as sources of power and/or influence gain for small states, namely information technology, knowledge, qualification of diplomats and administration, good leadership, political legitimacy, setting clear priorities, forming flexible alliances and exploiting market niches. Baillie (1998) extends this panel of proposed strategies to a possibility of gaining influence in the European Union (EU) on the basis of the advantages, deriving from historical context, a strategic geographical position and (cultural knowledge) regarding an important geographic area. This paper will attempt to explore the validity of this theory, verifying whether a small EU member state with the named advantages necessarily focuses its foreign policy strategy of gaining influence in the EU on prioritising its actions in this geographic area.

The paper will firstly focus on different interpretations of the concept (meaning) of a small(er) European state in the contemporary European integration process; the understanding of a small state will be scrutinised from the perspective of three methodological approaches - a realist, a liberalist and a social constructivist theory. Here I will attempt to show the difference between the notion of size and influence. Secondly, the paper will concentrate on identifying small states' strategies for gaining influence in the international community, particularly in the EU. Here a distinction between the traditional and post-Cold War strategies will be noted. I will explore one of the latter, namely the strategy of profiting from advantages, based on geographical proximity, historical context and therefore cultural knowledge of a specific – (for the EU) important geographic area. I will apply this theory to the case of Austria, Hungary and Slovenia, all small EU member states, (geographically and historically) close to the Western Balkans, the latter being a geographical area where (after Bulgaria and Romania) next steps of EU enlargement are previewed to be taken. The methodological approach applied in the research will be a content analysis of primary sources – strategies of foreign policy actions of the three respective governments and of a control group (other small EU member states, not close to Western Balkans), and consequently a comparative analysis of the findings for each small state.

I will ultimately attempt to explore whether the exposed theory of gaining influence in the EU is true in the case of the selected small states and geographical area

and if the findings would show the opposite, try to discover an explanation for the specific situation and possible reasons for applying a different strategy for influence gain in the EU.

Milan Brglez (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana)

LESSONS LEARNED FROM SMALL STATE'S RESEARCH FOR CONTEMPORARY DIAGNOSIS, PROGNOSIS, THERAPY

The paper is a modest answer to a question: what are some of the many lessons that we have been (or could be) able to learn in researching small states within political sciences. To provide such an evaluative story a heuristic analogy with the 'fate' of peace research is suggested. For both, peace and small states' research the predominance of political realism within International Relations, which flourished in and contributed to the (ideological justification and logic of) Cold War initially (in 1970s) offered a common ground they wanted to challenge. Both challenges were coloured with behaviourism, avoiding one reductionism (on the interstate security, and in case of small states on their viability) with another (reducing conflict to war or open violence and task of social sciences to correlations, and conceiving small states as property- or outcome-based concepts). The 'accumulation' of knowledge from 1980s suggests another similarity. Peace research focused on national and international structural conflicts, and small states research recognized the relevance of comparative and international structuring of political economy (including their dependence, (West) European provenience, often neutrality and importance of neighbourhood location compared to wider international contexts). Finally, the post-Cold War knowledge suggested the importance of cultural (normative) structures within which conflicts and small states are embedded.

With the rise of constructivism and other even more radical perspectives some deepening and widening of violent cultures become relevant, while small states were conceived by their status within (inter-subjective) institutionalized 'playgrounds' (and rules of) world politics. For this story a question whether the latest broadly constructivist focus on the importance of institutions and their influence on the logic of small states' agency represents a supplement to or a substitute of rationalism is less relevant than the recognition that both capabilities of small states and possibilities they get with their positioning within the international institutionalised contexts (in particular EU) they are co-constituting are important. This story leads to a conclusion that only an accurate (ontologically realistic) diagnosis and prognosis provide appropriate tools (concepts to know what to study and methods to know how to study) for the further research of the complexity of small states in their structured contexts.

Břetislav Dančák, Vít Hloušek (International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University Brno)

CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND POLAND

Paper deals with comparative analysis of Austrian and Polish foreign policy towards Central Europe. Central Europe is presented as core composed by Austria, Visegrad Group countries, Slovenia and in potential Croatia. Article is introduced by brief description of development of formulation and priorities of Austrian and Polish foreign policy design towards Central Europe since the early

1990s with strong emphasis on several last years. Austrian and Polish point of view are examined and discussed. Austria and Poland represent different type of countries but both have (or at least have had) aspirations for leading positions in Central Europe. These attempts have emerged during last fifteen years. Authors claim that Austria has ambition to play important role in Central European region and this approach was based on Austria's EU membership status. On the other hand, Poland describes itself as a regional leader which leading position resulted from fact that Polish contribution to European security and stability is obvious. We do not observe similar leadership tendencies by other Central European countries. The main concern is paid to analysis of these issues in regard to general diplomatic and political environment in Central European countries. The EU and NATO perspectives are discussed shortly. Article is concluded by evaluation of probability of playing leadership role of both countries in comparative perspective.

Andras Deak (Teleki Laszlo Institute, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies)

CONSOLIDATING THE EU'S EASTERN POLICY: IS THERE A ROLE FOR THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES?

Most of the Visegrad countries are eager to play a crucial role in shaping the Eastern European political and economic landscape. They pursue a high-profile pro-enlargement policy, actively advocating Ukraine's, Belarus' and Moldova's integration efforts. At the same time these countries' potential is obviously inadequate to set these issues on the agenda. Even such a policy-maker state like Poland has a rather limited influence in European matters. In this situation the Visegrad countries should separate their extreme ambitions from the attainable goals. A two-tier Eastern Policy could provide mutual benefits and guarantee positive outcomes even in negative enlargement scenarios.

The support of the further enlargement is a legitimate policy of the Visegrad countries. It is not only a strong and sincere commitment, but also an instrument of promoting their national interests. This political stance should be unambiguous. The Western-NIS countries *should* join the European Union if the basic requirements are fulfilled and the consequences for both parties are reasonable. Any misty argumentations about exclusion or even floating this question make more harm than good. At the same time Visegrad countries should make clear, that joining the EU is a very long process. Ukraine and Moldova have just made the first substantial steps towards the Union and many others are ahead.

Therefore the Good Neighbour status is rather the maximum, that these Eastern countries may expect from the Union in this decade. The EU's Neighborhood Instrument has obvious deficits: the partner countries are unsatisfied with it, the allocated financial assets are inadequate to trigger the integration process, it has no political substance. It is upon the advocate countries to make an effective European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the Eastern relation.

The ENP should be separated from the integration perspectives. The main rationale of the former is to establish a solid, pragmatic basis of cooperation, independent from the integration conjunctures in the NIS states. Stake everything on one card, overdependence on the Eastern political up-and-downs would hit back in case of negative integration outcomes. ENP should be much more about normal business, a politically neutral, unbiased in their preferences strategy. Such an attitude does not contradict to the Visegrad pro-enlargement position.

The Visegrad countries should not be afraid of using the ENP in an egoistic manner. ENP funds are below any standards. This financial background alone is

enough only to support some political projects but short of making a real progress. However with some other European and national money it could contribute to developing the Pan-European infrastructure, roads, pipelines. Taking into consideration their own investment needs, the Visegrad countries should use the ENP much more as a part of their own grand-projects, than as a Foreign Policy instrument.

The two-tier Eastern Policy could result in a much balanced and continuous Visegrad relationship towards the East. Supporting the joining on the political level and promoting their own interests on the pragmatic, ENP level, could lead to substantive synergies. Due to higher efficiency, the small Visegrad states can increase and find their special role on the European political landscape.

Mitja Durnik, Davorin Gjenero (Slovenian Association for Innovative Political Science SIDIP)

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION IN RESOLVING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO SMALL STATES – THE FUTURE SCENARIO IN RELATIONS BETWEEN SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

Slovenia and Croatia have a long history of conflicts after the break of Former Yugoslavia. Slovenia has just become a member of the European Union and Croatia is waiting for the start of negotiations for full membership somewhere in the future. Conflicts between these two small states are a part of public agenda especially in the time before every election. Can the European Union find a better solution for this type of conflict? Has the EU the right to intervene into disputes between two states? Our task is to make some possible suggestions (policy advocacy) which could help governments and negotiating bodies to find a more fundamental solution for better bilateral relations between Slovenia and Croatia.

Tamara Ehs (Department of political Sciences, University of Vienna)

SWITZERLAND – SPLENDID ISOLATION OR NEW INTERMEDIARY?

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain Switzerland's role as a neutral go-between was questioned. And as the European integration was moving forward the Swiss became quite isolated. As a result, a small majority voted for joining the United Nations in 2002 and Switzerland is now prepared to back UN actions. But the country still abstains from joining the European Union but found a way of living with the EU by negotiating a series of bilateral agreements also including security issues.

Although the Swiss prefer to go it alone, the country is looking for a replacement for its diminished political weight: Switzerland is providing assistance in the Balkans within the framework of Partnership for Peace and ESDP, planning to join the Schengen/Dublin-Agreement and giving support for the "Geneva Accord" – trying to find new ways of acting as an intermediary and to provide good offices to other countries. As a small, independent and neutral country Switzerland still wants to offer itself as a trustworthy go-between for today's conflicts and tries to do the splits between keeping a low profile in its own foreign and security policy without losing even more ground and to provide space for peace talks and other initiatives.

Old Role: “Good Offices” (a neutral mediator between countries not on speaking terms). But provision of good offices for conflict prevention and mediation has largely shifted to the United Nations.

New Role: “Security through Co-operation” and more active “Peace Facilitator”

- *Security through Co-operation* (Security Policy Report 2000): United Nations (2002), 2nd Bilateral Agreements with the European Union: Schengen/Dublin (vote on June 5th 2005)
- *Peace Facilitator*: Partnership for Peace (1996), Associated Member to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) (1999), “Swisscoy”-contingent for KFOR (1999), Participation in ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia (2003)

Difficulties: Peculiar linkage between Swiss identity and national security. Parts of the Swiss population feel that any European security co-operation is against neutrality and therefore against “Swissness” itself.

Sophie Enos-Attali (Institut d'études politiques de Paris – Sciences-Po/Institute of Political Sciences of Paris, France)

IS NON-ALIGNMENT STILL A RELEVANT FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OPTION FOR SMALL EU MEMBER STATES? A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CHOICES MADE BY AUSTRIA, FINLAND IRELAND, MALTA AND SWEDEN WITH RESPECT TO THE CHANGING GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Small States are often considered as characterized by a lack of power and vulnerability, by “*a deficit in influence and autonomy*”¹, that is to say weakness². They usually try to minimize or even to compensate for this lack of power through their foreign and security policy. Neutrality, which refers to a posture of impartiality adopted by States towards belligerents so as not to be involved in any conflict, has appeared through the years as a relevant security option for some of them³, particularly for those situated in an area where powerful opponents compete for influence: it is supposed to help such States to protect their territorial integrity and political independence.

But, many things have changed in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, which apparently questions the relevancy of neutrality as a useful tool for an international role of small States. As a matter of fact, in this new context, interdependence is on increase and it has become more and more difficult for small States to play a significant function on the international scene. This is all the more so true in Europe, with the integration process which takes place through the European Union, which looks for its own role in the world and where countries are trying to define new ways of cooperation to address the new global security problems. On a theoretical point of view, in such a context, neutrality doesn't appear anymore as a relevant security option for small States.

Nevertheless, none of the countries which were neutral during the Cold War has completely renounced to the core of neutrality, that is to say the non-participation in military alliances. If they have adapted their foreign and security policy to the new international order and, more specifically, to the European Union, at the

¹ Laurent Goetschel. “The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small States in Today's Europe”, in Laurent Goetschel (ed.). *Small States Inside and Outside the European Union*. Boston./Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, p. 19.

² Michael I. Handel. *Weak States in the International System*. London/Portland: Frank Cass, 1990.

³ Efraim Karsh. *Neutrality and Small States*. London/New York: Routledge, 1988.

same time, they have tried to minimize the impact of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on their own security choices and they maintain a position of “non-allied”.

Such an attitude reveals that environment is not the only criterion by which small States make their foreign and security policy choices, or more precisely, that small States are not dependent to their environment as much they used to be, at least in the European context: hence, through the European Union, the environmental structure has become for the EU member-States something they can shape. In such a situation, small EU member-States determine their foreign and security policy according to an environment they have contributed to shape and, so, can take into account also other criterions. This attitude, which appears as quite judicious, can be considered as indicative of what Europeanization is, that is to say an interactive process.

Ivan Grdešić (Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb)

SMALL STATES IN BIG ALLIANCES: US-ADRIATIC PARTNERSHIP CHARTER

The US- Adriatic Charter, an initiative in the spirit of the 1998 U.S.-Baltic Charter, was proposed jointly by the Presidents of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to President Bush at the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002. It was signed by four ministers of foreign affairs in Tirana on May 2, 2003. Charter as a diplomatic project had two objectives – to secure the open door NATO policy and to provide framework for the cooperation and mutual support of candidate countries. On both of these two accounts it was successful. The Charter partners made strong commitments on such areas as democratic reforms and the creation of the conditions for NATO membership. Additional effect of the Charter is the very real progress made in mutual relations of the countries of South East Europe by improving the security conditions in the region. US-Adriatic Charter of Partnership is a successful example of cooperation among small states with common interests.

István Hegedűs (Hungarian Europe Society)

ATTITUDES OF A NEW AND SMALL(ER) MEMBER STATE TO THE EU: HUNGARY'S ACCOMMODATION ONE YEAR AFTER ACCESSION

As a small(er) and new member state, Hungary has created its fundamentally pro-European political, but much more controversial emotional relationship with the European Union and the old member states during the fifteen years long accession period and after the first year of membership. Following the collapse of the communist system in 1989-1990, Hungarians overwhelmingly supported the idea to join the European integration. In the general perception of the people, however, the enlargement process of the European Union seemed to be surprisingly lengthy. By the second half of the nineties, cautious “europessimistic” attitudes have gained significance in the elite and public discourse about the historic project. Negative stereotypes attributed to the 'hidden agenda' of Western politicians have become common sense statements in the mass media. In the last fifteen years, major Hungarian political parties gradually shifted their vote-seeking messages from emotional pro-European statements to new emphases on the importance of “defending Hungarian interests” inside the EU. In contrast to the Czech Republic and Poland, where hard eurosceptical political forces with strong

popular support emerged during the European elections in 2004 held first time in the new member states, most of the Hungarians shared mixed views about the necessity of EU membership combined with fears of their secondary status inside the European club. By the first anniversary of the Accession Day, the threatening economic scenarios proved to be untrue in the whole region, whilst the realization of the hopes of citizens to enjoy more financial benefits transferred from the EU budget has become a feasible option. Meanwhile, the successful first steps of the national elites and the public administration to get involved into the common decision-making processes may also contribute to the ongoing Europeanization of Hungary.

Hans-Georg Heinrich (Department of political Science, University of Vienna)

CUSTOMIZED NEIGHBORHOOD POLICIES

The Neighborhood Policies of the European Union are a new dynamic and controversial issue. While the question of the borders and limits of the Union has hijacked the public debate, more fundamental issues such as the security of future energy supplies or the change in the transatlantic relationship, of NATO and OSCE, have the status of a hidden agenda. The small new members can provide valuable inputs about the new neighbors in the Balkans and the post-Soviet regions. Since, however, the success of the European peace project impinges upon its credibility, the Union cannot have 25 different neighborhood politics. A difficult learning process lies ahead, in which the delicate balance between national interests and European core interests will have to be found.

Mindaugas Jurkynas (Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University)

BALTIC POST-ENLARGEMENT IDENTITIES: BALTIC, NEW NORTH OR GOING THEIR OWN WAY?

The aim of the paper is to analyse new regional identities of the small states - Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. New regional identities reflect alliances small states try to acquire in order to have better political performance. The concept "Baltic states" was both an outsiders construct (Kirby 1998, 1999) and rested on the legacies of the Soviet occupation and similarity of foreign and security goals, that is NATO and EU membership vis-a-vis Russia (Miniotaite 2003, Jurkynas 2004). With the big bang of 2004 Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia became a part of the Transatlantic area. This event removed former bases of commonalities among the Baltics. A moot question concerns new gravities of the Baltic states in the post-enlargement period. Do Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia retain their Baltic identity, start gravitating northwards or acquire divergent patterns of identity construction? The article employs the Constructivist perspective on regional identity reconstruction and focuses on political narratives of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian presidents. The study tests a hypothesis that the Baltic identity gradually becomes "northernised" due to long-term networking and institutionalised patterns of cooperation with the Nordic counterparts. The study arrives at the conclusion that the Baltic regional identity is prevalent in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Its basis is historical legacies, which became a part of Baltic identity beyond Transatlantic integration.

Daniel Klimovský/ Zuzana Horanicova (University of P.J.Šafárik Košice, Faculty of Public Administration)

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION OF SMALL CEE COUNTRIES AT THE TURN OF 20TH AND 21ST CENTURY: THE CASE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

This article deals with the transformation process of democracy and democratic consolidation (in the Slovak Republic as an example of the small CEE country) that is related to the successful liberalization. There are mentioned the aspects of the democratization within the political system arguing with the former authoritative coalition according to new rules of game, and how these rules might be changed. It is necessary to understand the process of transformation from the former authoritative regime and building the institutions of the new democratic regime.

Umut Korkut (Doğuş University, Istanbul)

EUROPE'S BACK LAGGARDS: TURKEY AND CROATIA CATCHING THE EU TRAIN

This paper attempts to evaluate the recent Europeanisation efforts in Turkey and Croatia in the political sphere. Both Croatia and Turkey received a conditional green light from the EU to open accession negotiations in 2005.

Though these two countries have had different traditions of political regime, visible differences in size and population and different history of relations with the Union, they have had a common handicap towards EU membership. This handicap was a result of both countries suffering from a 'civil war' in the 1990s. These 'civil wars' resulted in delayed democratic consolidation in both of these states. Hence, both Turkey and Croatia could embark on democratisation more or less around the same time with the death of Tudjman in Croatia and with the retreating Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey.

From this point onwards, the paper examines the democratisation efforts in both of these states and the way the European Union responded to these efforts. Although in conventional terms of accession Croatia does not seem to be a complicated case, the war criminals and refugee settlement issues are contentious in its way to becoming an EU member. For Turkey as well, along with its numerous problems, human rights issues and refugee settlement in its East are problems. There is also EU conditionality for Croatia to improve its relations with its neighbours to the East. The latest Serbian-Croatian rapprochement is very much due to this conditionality. One can also approach the Turkish-Greek-Cypriot rapprochement in the context of EU conditionality as well.

As a result, the proposed paper is a novel attempt to draw comparisons between Turkey and Croatia as two back laggards in the EU accession process.

Adrianna Kosowska (University of Wroclaw)

EU - UNION OF SMALL STATES? ON THE EXAMPLE OF BATTLE FOR ROTATIONAL PRESIDENCY OF EUROPEAN COUNCIL

In the Union of 25 member states 19 are conventionally classified as the small ones. This group is very differentiated: small states have diverse economic interests, some are agrarian while others highly industrialized; they do not share any political ideology, nor conduct similar foreign policy. But in spite of a great

variety, small states share some common characteristics and have similar interests, especially if institutional reform is on the agenda. The paper discusses a possibility that small states would unite their efforts and build a long-term coalitions to counterbalance the power of six big states. The analysis is based on the example of debate over the future shape of rotational Presidency of the European Council. Almost from the beginning of the Convention the question of EC Presidency divided big and small Member States. The first were in favor of radical reforms in order to strengthen this function and increase its efficiency. The latter were interested in preserving the status quo in order to benefit from the rotation based on the principle of equality. It is analyzed why the reluctance of small states towards Presidency reform was so strong, what kind of initiatives and consultation mechanism were pursued and what are the prospect for the coalition building in the future.

Karin Liebhart (Department of Political Science, University of Vienna)

CULTURAL PATTERNS OF ENLARGEMENT: DO SMALL CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES SHARE COMMON VIEWS?

The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen support. Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil society for these developments. The political bid for consensus building around EU integration and the enlargement process is accompanied by public campaigns. Against this background the paper deals with selected images that figure prominently in these campaigns using three small EU members of the Central European region - Austria, Hungary and Slovakia - as examples. Starting from the assumption that national and European images used in the respective campaigns refer to underlying cultural patterns as frames of political orientation one may analyze commonalities and differences in the perception of political roles of the respective states in the new Europe.

Josef Melchior (Department of Political Science, University of Vienna)

REFRAMING EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: THE IMPACT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY

The paper examines the New Constitutional Treaty with the aim of identifying those elements that impinge on the structure and future mode of European governance. European governance cannot be grasped by any single model of operation or decision-making. Different modes of governance can be found in the EU that are shaped by different constellations of actors, practices and ideas. Approaches to the study of European governance also differ according to their substantive assumptions and normative perspective. Although these differences evolved in tandem with changes in the internal and international environment and national pressures and demands, they have become institutionalized and rooted by consecutive treaty amendments. European treaties, just like ordinary constitutions in general, do not only take note of given practices but also frame them in certain respects. The project of devising a Constitution for the EU grew out of an attempt to adjust the basic structure and modes of operation of the EU to the challenges of enlargement, globalisation and legitimacy. The paper assess the achievements of the Constitutional Treaty by depicting elements of continuity and change that most likely will have an impact on the different faces of European governance and the future role of small Member States within them.

Arunas Molis (Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University)

THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES IN CREATION OF EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

A lot has been done developing EU Security and Defence Policy, but Europe still lacks real military capabilities. Therefore, during their meeting in November 2004, EU Defence Ministers have agreed to create 13 "Battle groups" to be deployed to the World's hotspots.

Rapid development of ESDP required response from traditionally neutral and other small states of EU. And they gave their answer, but in rather different way. For example Austria is not likely to participate due to political problems until 2009. However, Finland has not only joined the Nordic battle group but also showed the initiative to invite Norway to this group. Ireland and Norway are questioning if the participation of their troops is not in conflict with their Constitutions. Small and comparatively poor Baltic countries have also expressed an interest on the Battle Groups and proposed concrete contribution.

The general aim of this study is to overview what can be done by small states by developing EU military capabilities and how they perceive this new challenge. At the same time this is an attempt to look on how the creation of EU army is changing the perception of neutrality in EU member states.

Development of EU Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not a new phenomenon.

Matej Pinter, Klementina Zapušek/ Slovenian Association for Innovative Political Science (SIDIP)

THE MEANING OF THE PRESIDENCY OF SMALL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES OF SLOVENIAN PRESIDENCY IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, OSCE AND EU

The article focuses on how small post-modern states can lead organizations in the international community. They participate in different international organizations to avoid uncertainty, to become internationally recognizable and to take an active part in the decision-making process on which they can also have an impact. Small states can use different strategies to influence international organizations i.e. use of 'soft power', mediation, multitrack diplomacy. Because of their limited resources they mostly operate in areas which are connected with their comparative advantages and goals in foreign policy. In the first place the article describes the role of the Slovenian presidency in the UN Security Council (the role of mediation, agenda-setting). In the second part the priority tasks of the current Slovenian presidency in The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, activities of the Chairman-in-Office and his role in promoting Slovenian national interests are presented. In the third part the article focuses on the future and indicates possible Slovenian activity in the co-presidency of EU. It also exposes the significance of having influence on agenda setting and the significance of using experiences from past presidencies. On the whole authors try to compare presidencies in three different international organizations and expose potentials, opportunities and challenges of successfully leading the international community for Slovenia and other small states.

Uroš Pinterič (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana)

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PARLIAMENTS IN SMALL CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES VIA THE WORLD WIDE WEB

In this article, author explores and analyzes Parliamentary English web pages of smaller Central and East European countries. In the time of information society even political institutions have to adopt newly developed technologies and use them in their daily internal communication as well as in contacts with own citizens and foreign visitors. Internet is special environment where even small states can become equally important and effective as their grater neighbors or they can even surplus them. But is this potential used as it could be? In the case of international presentation (providing information in English) of analyzed parliamentary web pages we will try to find some characteristics common to all small CEC parliaments as well as their differences showing their individual character and potential to influence via informing international virtual public. In the first part of article theoretical framework of research and methodology are set. In the second part author analyzes English web pages of six Central and East European Parliaments. In third part all collected data are compared and discussed. Last part of article includes some concluding remarks and ideas about possible improvements that could help to improve this aspect of internationalization of Central and East European parliaments.

Jan Pospisil, Stefan Khittel (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Commission for Social Anthropology)

FRONT-RUNNERS OR APPENDICES? ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL OF SMALL-STATES IN SECURITY-RELATED DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Small states have certain comparative advantages over their larger competitors in development cooperation, especially concerning the security aspect. They are rarely seen as direct threats or regional hegemons by other countries. Neutrality, real or perceived, can be another argument in pro. Yet, as the examples show, development policy has to integrate these possible advantages into viable strategies and then convert these into tangible programmes and projects that concentrate on issues such as conflict resolution or governance. Both (personal and financial) resources as well as political will have to be joined so that the potential that small states have to be front-runners in the security aspect of development cooperation can be realised.

András Rácz/ Teleki László Institute, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Budapest

A SMALL STATE AND ITS GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY – THE CASE OF MOLDOVA

The longest armed conflict of the post-cold war Europe is the conflict of Moldova and the separatist 'quasi-state', the non-recognized Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (TMR). Since the short civil war in 1992 resulting in the secession of the TMR the efforts by the European community aiming at the resolution of the conflict have not achieved any significant results.

Though the OSCE has a mission to Moldova it could not and cannot be really effective because of the divisions inside the organization – it is against the interests of Russia to find any solution resulting in the reunification of Moldova as this would mean the end of Moscow's presence and influence in the region.

Though during the Dutch OSCE presidency in 2003 an international peacekeeping force was planned to be sent to Moldova, due to the strong Russian opposition the plan was finally dropped.

The European Union has showed little interest in Moldova during the 1990's. The main reasons were the lack of an effective common foreign and security policy and the more intense conflicts on the Balkans. This passive policy started to change in 2002 as the EU realized that it has vital interests in the stability of the region, which - after the enlargement – has come to directly neighbour the EU. (The separatist TMR regime is a source of several so-called 'soft-security' challenges including smuggling, trafficking, illegal arms trade, etc.) At the same time Chisinau has gradually modified the orientation of its foreign policy in favor of relations towards the European Union.

The positive trend continued in 2003 when the EU expressed its concern for and interest in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. A few months later the EU announced its readiness to support the border management efforts by Chisinau on the Transnistrian section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border.

When the Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin refused to sign the Russian-influenced settlement plan, the so-called 'Kozak Memorandum' in November 2003, the split between Chisinau and Moscow became final. The EU takes a more direct approach towards the settlement of the Transnistria issue both in the *European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper* published in May 2004 and in the *Proposed EU-Moldova Action Plan*, indirectly blaming Russia for blocking the resolution efforts.

The chances of a permanent solution have significantly improved with the changes in the Ukraine. The new Ukrainian administration seems to be a willing partner of Brussels and Chisinau in ensuring the security of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, thus blocking the illegal trade activities of the TMR. In early 2005 the EU announced that a Special Envoy to Moldova is going to be appointed soon. Moreover there are talks about launching a police (or observation) mission as well. If the cooperative attitude of the Ukrainian government continues there are clear chances for the EU to become an effective actor in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

Henriette Riegler (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna)

SEE ENLARGEMENT – DO SMALL STATES HAVE A SPECIFIC ROLE?

SEE enlargement is much more than other enlargement cases a security related one. It was above all the war-form break-up of Former Yugoslavia that shaped the perception of the whole region – the (Western) Balkans. For a long time EC/EU had only peace keeping on its mind and was more than reluctant to embrace the region in a more inclusive way. It was up until the last of the Yugoslav wars, the Kosovo war that finally the EU saw enlargement of the region as a strategic necessity.

As most of the regions' states are indeed small states and have also small states as neighbours I will dig into the question if and how a specific role of the small state can be established in the process both from a security as from a political point of view.

Gergely Romsics (Kodolányi János University College, Székesfehérvár)

A HARD TEST FOR EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY ASSUMPTIONS: THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AND THE TRNC IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ACCESSION PROCESS

The paper sets out to examine tenets of the ENP by providing a rational-choice analysis of bargaining behaviour in the bilateral negotiations between the RoC and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the two years leading up to Cyprus' accession to the European Union. The analysis is intended to provide a more parsimonious, falsifiable and non-case-specific explanation of the failure of the negotiations despite unprecedented involvement, both in terms of participation and in terms of incentives, of various international actors. The explanation offered contains insights into why the assumptions behind the ENP may be misleading, while also permitting an outlook on small-state egoism and free-riding in densely institutionalized environments.

The paper proceeds by presenting the standard causal explanations of the negotiation process, drawing on the Europeanization literature of recent years. The constructivist assumptions driving these models are shown to be underspecified, yielding unclear predictions, and consequently not well-adapted to explain the political process of bargaining. As an alternative, a strictly rational-choice approach is proposed, building on the assumptions of the neorealist - neoliberal institutionalist synthesis of the early nineties. It is argued that if identity variables are replaced by strict profit-maximizing behaviour in profiling the players of the bargaining process, the European Union's approach to the Cyprus question can be shown as the key independent variable of both the switches in the positions of the individual parties, and the continuation of the deadlock after what seemed to be the prospect of a compromise solution.

In essence, the incentives provided by the EU were rational only if actors were assumed to be undergoing identity change. This, however, was hardly the case, as both the RoC and the TRNC exhibited consistency in refusing to abandon the Pareto-frontier, balancing security and material benefits – without any detectable sign of “ideational motivation”, i.e. willingness to “invest into the future” by committing credibly to cooperative patterns promoted by the ENP.

Based on the investigation of the Cyprus case, the paper proposes to treat models and theories that predict identity change with caution. While the findings by no means invalidate research with constructivist variables, it is suggested that such shifts in value perceptions and value systems take long, longer than assumed in some Europeanization theories. Therefore it may be more productive for a European Neighbourhood Policy to focus on material incentives and creating environments where cooperation strategies are strictly dominant for the parties even if only short- and medium-term term benefits (of security and wealth) are considered. Otherwise, small states of the less Europeanized mould will be tempted to free-ride on promises and commitments of strictly rule-following organizations and states.

Adrian Simon (Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University, Oradea)

THE EFFECTS OF HUNGARIAN PARTY SYSTEMS' CLEAVAGES ON ROMANIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

In this paper, I would like to present a possible model for the Central- and South-East-European region as regards the consequences of the interference between

two or more countries` domestic politics based on the transnational linkages developed by the political actors. The analyses will be focused on the particular relationship constructed between the Hungarian political sphere, which traversed rapidly the democratic consolidation period and satisfied effectiveness the E.U. enlargement requirements and, on the other hand, Romania, whose transformation from post-communism was more difficult.

The success of the Hungarian democratic stability has the background in the negotiated revolution period. As a continuity of that, there was a strong alignment between left- and right wing parties, each of them with a clear-defined set of political values, political orientation and interest representation of social/economic groups. In this political system with institutionalized cleavages, one of the main issue of confrontation is the statute of the Hungarian minority from the border countries. In the last few years, with topics like the double-citizenship, Facility Law or some conflictual type of political discourses, the right-wing parties (and especially Fidesz), dominated the political agenda from Romania and Hungary.

In the `90s, there was built a transnational network between Fidesz and the former Reformist Block, platform component of the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarians from Romania until last year. (At this time, this group was reorganized, and under the Hungarian Civic Alliance name, they act separately by DAHR.) In the 1998-2002 period, Fidesz, had implemented projects and programs addressed to the Hungarian community from Romania, with issues oriented towards some priorities from education, church sphere, media or youth NGOs sector.

Only as a response to this strong political linkage, the Hungarian Socialist Party became to built its own network. But in this case, the actors (HSP and DAHR) did not accentuate the necessity of political values implementation than the economic cooperation. Due that after 2000`s election DAHR has an strong cooperation with the (Romanian) Social Democratic Party materialized through Parliamentary support, indirectly, there was formed a triangle relationship between DAHR-HSP-SDP.

As a conclusion, there can be remarked that the Hungarian political system` internal (vertical) cleavages was transformed in the second phase, in a transnational one (horizontal), existing at this time a conservative and a socialist network between the two countries.

All of these shows that the historical background of the region created the possibility for a few political actors to identify themselves extended on the borders. As a consequence, the country could define itself and its role in the regional policy-maker process, as one that shapes or one that only react to already existing issues. Before the NATO or E.U. integration, some former small countries in the Communist period, like Hungary, succeeded to become a regional leader, based exactly how they managed until now the regional interactions and interference.

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FROM THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY TO ENLARGEMENT: DYNAMIC CASE STUDIES BASED ON A.-M. SLAUGHTER'S "LIBERAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW"

Anne-Marie Slaughter's liberal theory of international law, by applying a set of institutional criteria such as juridical equality, constitutional protections of

individual rights, representative republican governments and market economies, substantively distinguishes between “Liberal” states, which, by their domestic characteristics, operate in the zone of law and “Non-liberal” states, which, lacking these criteria, operate outside of the zone of law, in the zone of politics. In Slaughter’s model, therefore, two different classes of actors are identified in world politics, each having distinct patterns of interaction among one another and towards each other.

This paper attempts to elaborate on Slaughter’s theorising by enabling it to explain change in the international system: it seeks account for the transition of a state from the zone of politics into the zone of law and the emergence of subdivisions in the zone of politics, which are phenomena not investigated by Slaughter.

Firstly, through an analysis of the EU’s enlargement policy and the ENP with respect to new and prospective candidates it will be argued that a dynamic liberal institutionalist approach accounts for the general, substantive course of integration by the investigation of the relationship between the progress of the state’s institutional conformity as required and specified by the EU as independent, and the consequent even deeper stage of integration as dependent variables.

Secondly, it will also be demonstrated through illustrative case studies drawing on the experience primarily of Turkey and Croatia that with respect to the procedural dimension of integration, additional intervening variables can be identified. These factors, however, cannot be operationalized within Slaughter’s framework for the established liberal image of institutions characterized by a deeply interconnected relationship of ideology and structure is inflexible to serve as an adequate basis to explain mutual agency-structure interaction.

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THE STRATEGIC MOTIVATIONS FOR CONTINUED EU-NATO CO-OPERATION

Joint security governance in a Transatlantic regime?

The difficulties of finding consensus over collective security priorities as well as the allocation of assets for both NATO and EU to tackle threats – as described by their respective security strategies - simultaneously should not be underestimated. Although it would be crucial for the definition of the underlying rational and driving objective of *security governance* both at regional and global level, nevertheless contending preferences persist and maintain some degree of the uncertainty about the feasibility of a harmonious and effective co-operative NATO-EU relationship.

Security governance (governance of the conditions of security) can be conceived as the institutional contribution to and the legal matrix of the containment and the termination of violent and grave disruptions of order. It embraces a great variety of measures aimed at the prevention of fertile conditions (lawless vestiges of anarchy in the inter-state system) and organised networks of trade in violence from emerging, and the proliferation of devastating instruments of violence. The most relevant quality of any attempt at the creation or maintenance of an inter/transnational regime with these purposes is the orchestrated capacity to shape the security environment. It can take place in the (trans)formation of the

normative framework of collective security by the (re)definition of their constitutive elements adapting them to the changing needs and circumstances of effective international responses.

Division of labour or competition?

The ESDP was declared to achieve a complete operational capability by 2003, which is extremely important for its effectiveness and credibility. The ESDP is the expression of the EU's willingness to play a broader role as international actor, and it is still making its first steps. Consequently, its future is also characterized by many uncertainties.

The *relations between the EU and NATO* are bound to stay a crucial element in any assessment of the future EU responsibility in international security management. To many one qualification seems of decisive importance: the ESDP should not be designed and engineered to become a *rival or competitor to NATO*. Nevertheless, it has become a consensual Transatlantic wisdom by now that the EU could build *an autonomous capacity in order to act when and where NATO does not want to engage itself*. Reasonably, this capacity should be developed in consultation with NATO in order to *avoid unnecessary duplications*.

NATO and EU as “competing structures”? It makes sense only if understood as competition for the same *limited set of capabilities* (military personnel and equipment) intended to be employed in the service of competing ends and missions.

As the EU military chief outlined: “U.S. forces would handle *high-intensity operations* involving terrorism and weapons of mass destruction while Europeans would concentrate on sustained *low-intensity crisis* management such as conflict prevention”.⁴

Gediminas Vitkus (Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius)

FROM IRAQ TO UKRAINE: EU FOREIGN POLICY AND AMBITIONS OF THE SMALL(ER) STATES

Today we could observe a new appraisal of academic interest for the small states problematique. This interest was encouraged by increase of the small states number because of collapse of the communist bloc and the Soviet Union as well as EU's and NATO's enlargements, which has brought a big amount of new smaller states into already well settled structures of decision-making and certain political culture. This paper is also supposed to contribute to this mainstream research area.

Its main objective is evaluate already existing contribution of the smaller Central and Eastern European (CEE) states to EU's common foreign policy during the course of 2003-2004. These two years were chosen deliberately, because during that period of time we were able to observe two dramatic cases. The first case was – the so-called the Iraqi crisis of February 2003, when the smaller CEE states didn't align themselves with the Franco-German anti-American stance. The second case is the successful mission carried out by the Polish and Lithuanian Presidents and EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on behalf of the European Union in Kyiv in December 2004.

⁴ ‘Europe must defend itself, says military chief’, *EUobserver*, 19.01.2004, *Reuters* 18.01.2004

Both cases showed very obviously that (non)involvement of the smaller states contributed to the (un)success of the each case. Also both of them made obvious that the European common foreign and security policy cannot be by definition equaled to the French and German opinion. The common policy will come up only when the smaller member states will be involved in the process.

The second point of the paper is a demonstration that one of the main obstacles for wider involvement of the smaller CEE states into common European foreign policy is widely-assumed prejudice, which considers the CEE states as russo-phobic, pro-American and not interested in the EU's CFSP at all. As the Ukrainian case displays the smaller states are much more eager to comply to the European Union's values than the great powers do. In difference from the great powers the smaller states are not burdened by the frame of mind about their own special mission and could more easily to transfer their attention to the common values, which the European Union is based on.

As a sort of recommendation for the sake of future of the common European foreign policy the paper suggests to establishing a sort of gentlemen agreement among the EU Member States. As far as the new Constitution for Europe foresees two new important positions – the President of the European Council and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would be useful to agree that the representatives of the Great Powers would not keep both positions at the same time. By the way, this system is already functioning in NATO. As far as the SACEUR is always American, the NATO Secretary General is European. In future, when European armed forces may equal American probably even the rotation would be possible.

Teodora Aurora Vrancean (Department of political Science, University of Vienna)

EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: RENATIONALIZING OR REGROUPING?

The current world picture is marked by a large number of unknown variables– a new world order, new challenges and threats, as well new participants. Simultaneously new measures are demanded to meet around these novel challenges. Characteristic is also an expanded security concept, where the boundaries between internal and external security disappeared. In this context no single country can face these new challenges alone.

A bundling up of sovereignty and measures is needed. An example for this method is the European Union, who understands itself as a global participant in this new world order and tries to assume its responsibility accordingly to this status. The construction of the ESDP was meant to be a further step in this direction, but the dispute in the Iraq crisis seemed to set an end to this development. Despite this pessimistic view, today – two years later we can also say that the crisis was an impulse giver for further integration steps in developing a European Security and Defense Policy. However, the lessons learned should not be forgotten. Those who want to unite Europe against the US will actually split it and that smaller countries cannot be simply ignored, because in this case solidarity notes will often be the case.

Nevertheless, the development of the ESDP must also be observed in a larger strategic context. It concerns the future of the European Union - the question of the security policy organization of Europe and secondly, it concerns the further security cooperation between the United States and EUrope. In this context, the

position of bigger, as well as small countries and their coalition-patterns will be authoritative for the development direction.

Therefore, this paper will analyze the past developments in the ESDP since September, 11 and tries to identify some trends for future developments.

Šárka Waisová (Westbohemian University/ Faculty of Arts, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Prague)

SMALL EUROPEAN STATES AND THEIR PARTICIPATION ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION – STRATEGIES AND ACTIVITIES

The paper will focus on activities and strategies of small European states in international conflict resolution. The main issue, which the paper will open, is the human security concept and development strategies. Firstly it will be shown, what is human security, secondly, which European states took over that concept and how is the concept applied by small European states. The paper will also address the question, why small states took over this concept and how see the concept bigger European states.

Jerzy J. Wiatr (WSHE Warsaw)

SMALL POWER'S STRATEGY: POLAND AND THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS 2004

Political scientists discussed the role of the smaller states in several studies published in nineteen-sixties and seventies. They focused on policy choices small power faced when joining multi-national alliances and within them. Recently, the attention focuses on how much a small powers can influence political developments both within the alliances they belong to and outside them.

Poland's involvement in the negotiated solution of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2004 shows that a smaller power can use its assets to influence events. When the political scene in Ukraine polarized between two camps (respectively represented by Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko) Russia tried to influence the outcome by giving support to Yanukovych. The United States and the European Union remained neutral to the crisis, mostly due to their unwillingness to do damage to relations with Russia. When the run-off election had been rigged and Yushchenko's supporters began street protests, Polish public opinion solidly sided with the Ukrainian opposition. Poland's President Aleksander Kwasniewski in a series of visits to Kiev helped both sides of the Ukrainian crisis to reach a negotiated compromise. The run-off results were declared void by the Supreme Court and in the repeated vote Yushchenko won the presidency. Poland was able to help her neighbor to chose democratic solution of the crisis and continues to support Ukraine's efforts to join the European Union. In the long run such policy serves Poland's interests but its immediate consequence has been the deterioration on Polish-Russian relations.

Anna Zadora (Department of political Sciences, Strasbourg)

BELARUSIAN EXCEPTION IN THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY.

It is important to analyze the "European paradox" – cultural, ideological, political distance between Belarus and its European neighbors despite of geographical proximity. The Belarusian case reveals complexities of European foreign policies.

The first part of the paper is an attempt to explain the situation from the Belarusian point of view and the second one is the European vision of the bilateral relation with Belarus.

The political and cultural abyss between the European Union and Belarus is due to the difference of Belarusian and European historical and political choices. The European Union and Belarus have chosen opposite trajectories of development which never interfere. Belarus is situated in European continent and it is certainly a part European historical and cultural legacy, but this country is not concerned by European integrative processes. The consequence of the Belarusian exception is the following: from one hand, Belarus can not benefit from common European cultural, intellectual, scientific and educational *acquis*. From the other hand, European historical, intellectual and cultural patrimony is deprived of Belarusian contribution.

One of the explanations is the particularity of Belarusian historical and political choice. Known as “the most Soviet of the USSR Republics” for many reasons, Belarus has been preserving many characteristics of Soviet society. The result of this persistent conformity to Soviet traditions is the continuation of ideological war East-West inherited from Soviet period and buttressed by actual official rhetoric. In Belarus, the European Union is considered like something different, stranger, unknown and even hostile. The ignorance of “European factor” by Belarus is the continuity of Soviet diplomatic practice. The major reference and the legitimacy of the current Belarusian political establishment is the Soviet legacy. Persistence of Soviet traditions means also persistence of Soviet stereotypes.

Reference to Soviet past also implies reference to Russia like to a key partner. From the geo- political and cultural point of view, Belarus is situated at the crossroads between European civilization (the European Union) and the specific Russian Euro- Asiatic civilization. This fact explains why Belarus was often a victim of bloody conflicts between the two parts of Europe, which had impact on the weakness and late internal consolidation of Belarusian nation and state. Internal weakness influences external policy of Belarus. Being a small country on the European map without important diplomatic, military or political weight, Belarus has to seek for protection of an important player on international scene. All historical, cultural, political ties and the political will of the present authorities make Belarus turn to Russian Federation. It is important to underline that Russia is on a more advanced stage of dialogue with the European Union. This fact deepens divergence between Russian and Belarusian foreign policies. Integration process with Russia, which Belarus put on its political agenda does not promote its involvement in European common dynamic. All above –mentioned facts make “Belarusian exception” on the European map. It is the only country having a common border with the European Union but having not political will to start partnership negotiation.

Actually Belarus is the only European successor State of the former USSR without a ratified Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. Technical assistance of the EU for Belarus is limited to humanitarian or regional projects or to those which directly support the democratization processes.

The European Union enlargements have an important impact on its internal dynamic and rules. The 2004 EU enlargement highlighted problems of new neighborhood in Europe. Following the European Council in Thessaloniki, which endorses the approach proposed by the European Commission for strengthening relation with the new neighbors of the enlarged UE, the Commission takes important decision on the implementation of its policy of “Wider Europe”, using the principle of differentiation of the relationship with different neighboring countries. The relationship of the EU-new neighbors has to be based on shared democratic political and economic values.

Belarus does not comply with European criterion concerning democratic principles, human rights, market economy, but the European reaction towards to Belarusian sociopolitical “particularities” doesn’t contribute to the improvement of the situation. Restrictive measures deployed by the European Union in reply to Belarusian political “specificities” don’t persuade Belarusian authorities to change political course. The result of “cold confrontation” is the deterioration of relationship. No one statement of the European Union has been taking into consideration by Belarusian government. Nowadays, the European countries tend to ignore Belarus. This is an important aspect of problematic relationship between the EU and Belarus. European Union has been replying to Belarusian silence about new neighbors in the same way: avoiding discussion and disregard. This reaction makes cross-cultural and political dialog impossible.

European silence about European-Belarusian relations, as well as avoiding discussion about relations with Western neighbors from Belarusian side increases Belarusian isolation and brings tensions to European scene. A small country can become a big problem when it hinders common European dynamic, which has successfully being developing “from Brest to Brest”, but which is stopped at the Belarusian border. This situation is susceptible to call into question the universality of European fundamental principles.

The European Union has adopted an “expecting” attitude towards to Belarus. The development of relation depends on implementation of further reforms and the willingness to respect international commitment and common values on democracy and human rights. EU relations with Belarus will continue to depend on progress towards democratisation and reform. The concept of “wider Europe” and neighborhood policy in Belarus, is in “expectation” stage and will probably remain in flux.

The Belarusian isolation in a long-term perspective can become an important obstruct for the EU advancement and it will not be possible to pass “Belarusian case” over in silence. The EU and Belarus will be constraint to start negotiation and to take each other into consideration much more seriously and to transform “expectation” attitude into an active reconciliation and convergence.