From security policy to security governance: The consequences of the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan on the organisation of security policies
Case study: The United States of America

Šárka Waisová

Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, The University of West Bohemia, waisova@kap.zcu.cz

„US operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the need for effective interagency coordination mechanisms. … [S]hift in strategy and the need to respond rapidly and flexibly to dynamic environments requires adaptation of our (US – author's note) *national security architecture to create and implement a new approach to the organization and use of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic success."*
(USJFCOM 2010: I-1)

"The lessons learned from … expeditions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to strong internal reassessments through the government .…"
(USJFCOM 2010: I-5)

"In this world it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals. American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together. … So to advance transformational diplomacy we are empowering our diplomats to work more jointly with our men and women in uniform... These experiences (Iraq and Afghanistan – author's note) *have shown us the need to enhance our ability to work more effectively at the critical intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security."*
(Condoleezza Rice, January 18, 2006, Remarks at Georgetown School of Foreign Service, http://gos.sbc.edu/r/rice3.html).

Introduction

Located on the border of one of Afghanistan's most insecure areas, Bakwa District in Farah Province has seen little development aid. Coalition forces and USAID have identified Bakwa as an area in need of stability initiatives because insurgents are using it as a safe area. In response to this need, USAID has worked with the local community to implement a small-scale community roads project. This has connected Bakwa residents with government-delivered services, demonstrating the Afghan Government's ability to respond to their needs. These projects not only provided local residents with temporary employment; they also helped to build relationships between the communities and their local government. The improved access to main roads also enhanced access to markets. Projects such as these contribute to USAID's flagship

stabilization effort in the region. They engage communities in unstable areas to take an active role in their own security.[1]

Approximately 60 soldiers from across Illinois, as well as two soldiers from Michigan and South Dakota respectively, have been deployed to Kunar province since June 2011 with the Illinois Army National Guard's Agribusiness Development Team (ADT). The Illinois team's mission is part of a broad effort that involves multiple National Guard ADTs from several states, each operating within its own province. The teams typically come from mid-western states, which are known for agriculture production. The Guardsmen bring with them more specialized skills than those of the usual advisory panels that typically helm projects such as these. This mission calls for military members with expertise in farming, raising livestock and cultivating natural resources. The ADT, which consists of a headquarters element, a security force platoon and a platoon of agriculture experts, have been assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in revitalizing and establishing a strong, growing and sustainable agriculture industry. The US military recognized the necessity of such teams in late 2007 when reconstruction teams realized people in rural areas needed something more pressing than a new school or road. Across Afghanistan, these teams have been inundated with requests for help with farming and other agricultural endeavors.[2]

What do both stories indicate? Both stories illustrate how far the role of the USAID and of the US military forces changed. On the one hand USAID goal in Afghanistan is (among other things) to strengthening the security of the local people and of the coalition forces, the military forces on the other hand realize development projects such as education of the local peasants and introduction of new agriculture technologies – activities very far away from the combat operations and traditional fight against the enemy.

In the last two decades the security environment has drastically changed. Thanks to technological development and the interconnectedness of all parts of the world we are continually facing new and unforeseen threats stemming from violent conflicts in distant places and from international military crises. Almost all governments have reacted to the new security environment and dealt with it

---

[1] USAID, "Road links rural communities to government services and local leaders
Where Instability Threatens, Roads Unite":
http://www.usaid.gov/stories/afghanistan/s_af_rural_road_project.html (September 23, 2011).
[2] US Army, "Agri-business Development Team plants seeds of hope for Afghan people" (http://www.army.mil/article/23919/) and "Agribusiness Soldiers focused on Afghanistan mission" (http://www.army.mil/article/66004/Agribusiness_Soldiers_focused_on_Afghanistan_mission/), both September 26, 2011.

before it becomes a crisis. That is why stabilisation, reconstruction and the prevention of violence have emerged as the key and strategic components of security and defense policies in last two decades.

The main argument of the present text is that 9/11 and the consequent international engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed huge demands on national security arrangements. The stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan led many governments to reorganise and re-frame national security policy and transform domestic governmental structures and practices. Emphasising the ability to deal with emerging risks, governments argued that they need to use all the instruments of national power so that the sum of the effort will be much bigger than its component parts. The result of the transformation process is a new structure of security policy, which can be described as security governance.

The security governance is quite new – not entirely embedded – concept, or new analytical perspective respectively and has been analysed only by a few authors. The first group of scholars (for example Kirchener 2006 and later Kavalski 2009) uses security governance as analytical perspective and approaches it like specific process with the particular constellation of various actors operating on various levels. The second group of scholars (for example Schneckener 2006 and Hänggi 2005) uses the security governance to research security sector in failed and failing states. Those scholars are talking about security governance without government and explore the security sector within the state, where the government was replaced by private actors. The third group of scholars (for example Daase, Friesendorf and their colleagues in Daase a Friesendorf 2010) researches security governance on the international/global level of analyses. The existing research for now omitted – quite logically because of lack of the empirical material[3] – the exploration of security governance through government at the national level. The present text would like to be innovative in the way that applies security governance approach at the national level of analysis.

The above purposed argument will be defended in three steps: Firstly, I will explain the difference between security policy and security governance; secondly, I will show how and why the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan created the condition which gave rise to security governance; and thirdly, I will set out the empirical evidence which supports the case. I will

---

[3] Some countries formulated an integrative approach to security, governance and development by bringing together defense, foreign and development ministries, but this effort is still in the testing phase.

show that post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction were acknowledged as being core defense activities and this fact led to the integration of security, development and diplomacy. Afterwards, an organisational, institutional and budgetary transformation took place.

Security governance

Security governance is emerging as a new form of security policy. The concept of security governance is based on an older concept of governance without government which refers to governance as decentralised and horizontal (Rosenau 1992) and as "processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group" (Keohane 2002: 202). Security governance refers to a new organisation of security policy, which differs from the traditional approach to national security. Security policy has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the state and the prerogative of sovereign statehood, was used to having a clear chain of command, and relied on codified rules, explicit agreements and strict measures of verification to secure compliance. Security governance involves a plurality of actors, is marked by non-linear, horizontal policy coordination, prefers less institutionalised forms of cooperation in which compliance is not ensured through the narrowly defined self-interest of a fear of punishment, but through the shared belief and conviction to do the right thing, and its goal is to create a secure global environment for states as well as for social groups and individuals (Daase and Friesendorf 2010: 3).

"At the national level, security governance refers to the organisation and the management of the security sector. The security sector includes all the bodies whose main responsibilities are the protection of the state and its constituent communities – ranging from the core structures such as armed forces, police and intelligence agencies, to those institutions that formulate, implement and oversee internal and external security policy such as executive government and parliament. More often than not, non-state actors, armed groups as well as civil society organisations, also play an important role in national security governance – the former by providing or jeopardising security, the latter by strengthening governance mechanisms" (Hänggi 2005: 9).

Why the stabilisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq gave rise to security governance

"Post-war reconstruction and peace-building" is a term referring to a long-term process launched after the end of an armed conflict with the aim of consolidating peace and preventing new outbreaks of armed violence. Post-conflict reconstruction and peace building as an institutionalised approach to conflict prevention in international relations emerged for the first time after the Second World War in the recovery of Germany and Japan. Considering the fact that at the end of the 1950s most of the war-torn countries had recovered and US projects of economic assistance within post-conflict reconstruction programs accomplished their mission, post-conflict reconstruction as a foreign policy strategy took a back seat.

A renewal of interest in post-conflict reconstruction as a foreign and international policy instrument began in the mid-1990s, especially after the outbreak of many regional conflicts and civil wars when states and international organisations reacted by modifying policy and security instruments. The rise of interest in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building contributed to a significant reconceptualisation and popularisation in both theory and practice.

The modification of the concept of effective policy and security instruments resulted in reforming the approach to conflict resolution. Under the framework of conflict management and post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction policy first strategies based on a merger of security and development or, in other words, of diplomacy, defense and development emerged and first bodies coordinating foreign, security and development policy, and civil-military relations have been established. UN military missions, which were originally charged with ensuring (military) security after the end of an armed conflict, began to provide humanitarian assistance and development projects which contributed to a gradual merging of civil and military activities under the umbrella of peace missions.

It was not until before the end of the 1990s when the integration of development and security in the form of a post-conflict assistance model was codified and implemented. In the last decade development assistance has become integral part of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.[4] In the post-conflict

---

[4] Here it is necessary to make a short digression from the critical discussion about development and humanitarian assistance as instruments of peace-building and reconstruction. Sometimes it is considered difficult to differentiate between post-war reconstruction and peace-building from the provision of humanitarian and development assistance or, more precisely, many questions arise from the inclusion of humanitarian and development assistance into the project of post-war recovery and peace-building. At least three questions should be answered regarding the inclusion of humanitarian and development assistance into post-war assistance and peace-building: 1. whether the principles of humanitarian assistance are compatible with the principles and goals of post-war assistance, 2. how to coordinate both activities including the promotion of the same values, and 3.

assistance model stabilisation is defined as the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to the resurgence of violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development. Reconstruction refers to the process of rebuilding the degraded, damaged or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country to create the foundation for long-term development (USJFCOM 2010a: I-8).

The concept of post-conflict assistance comprising of stabilisation and reconstruction has spread extraordinarily since 2001 in the context of international engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Development and reconstruction projects are, in the case of both countries, realised in an insecure environment under many insurgent attacks. The reality of the Afghani and Iraqi environment and the effort to continue the stabilisation and reconstruction of both countries urge civilian agencies to cooperate with military forces or private military companies at all levels, including operations in the field. The development projects are sometimes realised even only by military forces themselves.[5]

The lessons learned from the engagement of the armed forces in humanitarian missions and post-war reconstruction operations generated new methods and procedures of involvement of the military forces into the development agenda and post-conflict assistance: civil-military cooperation and in particular to form provincial reconstruction teams.

---

how to evaluate the (in)effectiveness of both activities. Some authors (see e.g. Schloms 2003 or Leonhardt 2001) even argue that the goals of humanitarian and development projects may be contradictious to the goals of post-war assistance and peace-building. On the one hand, reconstruction and stabilisation forces need quick impact projects to bring about short-term results in order to persuade the people to support their government, on the other hand development agencies focus on investments with lasting benefits which take a long time to produce returns. Furthermore, reconstruction and stabilisation are clearly politically motivated and oriented, and therefore it is a question whether to identify the activities with common humanitarian and development assistance.

[5] The involvement of AF into support of development was made possible because of the transformation of norms and rules for official development assistance (hereafter ODA) provision. The main donor countries representative – The OECD Development Assistance Committee – supported, by the end of the 1990s, the engagement of AF in humanitarian operations (see OECD 1998) and made it possible to report some activities realised by AF or connected with the maintenance of security as ODA. In 2007 OECD DAC accepted a new directive, which agreed that certain conflict, peace building and security expenditures meet the development criteria of ODA. Eligibility criteria has included management of security expenditures (covering the technical cooperation of government to improve oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management accountability and auditing security expenditure), enhancing civil society's role in the security system, child soldiers (covering the support and the application of legislation designed to prevent recruitment of child soldiers and efforts to demobilise, disarm, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle child soldiers), security system reform, covering rehabilitation assistance to demobilised soldiers, demining and UXO removal, small armed and light weapons control and prevention and/or reduction of their proliferation (OECD 1997: 13-14).

To sum up, the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan by their demands urged intervening governments to integrate all the instruments of national power including diplomacy, defense and development and to intensify the cooperation of the military and civilian agencies in order to realise the task. The integration of diplomacy, defense and development on the background of stabilisation and reconstruction policy give rise to security governance.

I decided to analyze the American case because:
- in the case of Iraqi and Afghani stabilisation and reconstruction, Washington plays a role of a major donor providing the majority of assistance bilaterally, which consequently means that the US needs to manage and inspect the entire process itself;
- US allies, mainly EU and NATO countries including the EU, which also functions independently, build a similar system of security policy, which helps unify coalition/alliance stabilisation and reconstruction approaches; and
- last but not least, states and multinational bodies often adopt the strategic planning of the dominant nation of multinational operation; this role is often played by the US.

Security governance as a new mode of US security policy
The United States always preferred the concepts of national and international security, where international security has been seen as tied to national interest and with its presence in the world made synonymous with US national security. The security-development nexus in US foreign policy has been traditionally understood as using development assistance as an instrument for strengthening US national security. Occurrences of using development policy for the support of US national security lessened after the end of the Cold War (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998). Regarding this fact, no penetration of development issues into US security policy and no fundamental changes in organisation, institutional character or budgeting of US security policy took place in 1990s.
Not until the global war on terrorism and the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan were US security policy and governmental structures and practices reorganized and reframed. The transformation of US security policy comprises mainly the inclusion of stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction among the key US security instruments and strategies of the security policy, the modification of the relationships and methods of cooperation among the

Department of Defense, State Department, the National Security Council[6], and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)[7], the change of tasks carried out by US armed forces and last but not least the new interpretation of civil-military relations, the change of the role of USAID in national security and of the legal framework of official development assistance provision.

In the following part of the text the contemporary institutional, organisational and budgetary form of US security policy will be explored. At the end of the following part the actors of US security governance will be analysed.

The institutional, organisational and budgetary form of US security governance on the background of stabilisation and reconstruction policy

When engaging in international peacekeeping operations in 1990s, the reaction of the US was based on *ad hocism* and no domestic structure of inter-agency planning or coordination existed. For the post-conflict reconstruction of governmental institutions, the economy and the civil-society of foreign countries, The US mainly deployed its armed forces. The reason for this approach was not only that the US army has had significant resources, but also the fact, that no other agency or body had a sufficient chain of command and management, human resources or the organisational capacities to realise stabilisation and reconstruction operations.

The first step aiming to build a coordination framework for the organisation of the stabilisation and reconstruction operations and to address the need for bringing all the instruments of national power together has been the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 named *The Clinton Administration´s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations* which was introduced in May 1997. The PDD 56 defined the method of cooperation between military and civilian agencies by the planning and realisation of the stabilisation and reconstruction operations. The PDD 56 has never been formally implemented (Serafino and Weiss 2006: 4; USJFCOM 2010a: I-4). The Clinton administration also tried to reorganise the international deployment of US civilian police forces. The PDD 71 has been introduced to solve the issue, but also this PDD has been applied only a few times and with limited success.[8]

---

[6] NSC and the contemporary Department of Defense was established by the National Security Act from 1947. The Central Intelligence Agency was established as well.

[7] USAID was established as an independent governmental body, but the Clinton administration subsumed USAID into the control of the State Department.

[8] The reason why both PDDs have not been realized is probably the deterioration of civil-military relations in the USA. US civil-military relations had been deteriorating for a generation, but came to a low point under Clinton,

Various narratives (see above) give evidence, that the impulse behind the real transformation of the US approach has been the lessons learned "from military led expeditions in Iraq and Afghanistan" (USJFCOM 2010: I-5). From the reassessments under the Bush government emerged new documents building a framework for the new organisation of US foreign and security policy: National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, the Directive of Department of Defense 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) *Military Support For Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations*, new wording of *the National Defense Authorization Act* (mainly provision 1207) and the Instruction of Department of Defense 3000.05 (DODI 3000.05) *Stability Operations*.

The key document for the institutional, organisational and budgetary transformation which forms US security governance is NSPD-44. The directive set up the Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (NSC/PPC) and created bases for the following foundations of the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Office of the Coordinator was established in July 2004 and is understood as, thus far, one of the biggest changes in US stabilisation and reconstruction policy. Following this transformation, there have been other offices, agencies and bodies established in connection with projects and activities of the Office of the Coordinator.

The creation of the S/CRS responded to increased calls for the improvement of US civilian capabilities to plan and carry out post-conflict state-building operations. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is intended to address longstanding concerns, both within Congress and the broader foreign policy community, over the appropriate capabilities and processes to deal with transitions from conflict to sustainable stability. The Office works as an inter-agency group bringing together officers and the authority of the State Department, Department of Defense, USAID, Department of Commerce, and Department of Homeland Security. The S/CRS is establishing the basic concepts, mechanisms, and capabilities necessary to carry out stabilisation and reconstruction operations. The Office's responsibility is to monitor and plan ahead for dealing with potential conflicts, to develop the first phase of a rapid response crisis management capability, to improve interagency

who was uniquely reviled by the military and whose administration treated military with unique contempt and neglect (Ellner 2010: 7).

and international coordination, to develop interagency training exercises, and to help the State Department's regional bureaus develop concepts and proposals for preventive action.[9] It plans projects integrating security and development activities, decides on the mandate and deployment of humanitarian, stabilisation and reconstruction teams to regional combatant commands and monitors political and economical instability in particular countries to prepare US assistance forces for foreign deployment (more see Nash and Knudsen undated 11 and Serafino 2009: 9ff). Since 2006 the project of the rapid response civilian task force has been developed. The rapid response team is planned to be main civilian body participating in complex peace operations and stabilisation and reconstruction missions and is intended to replace the civilian police and military forces.

Following the activities of the S/CRS the US government (USG) established in 2007 the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS). To use the system is obligatory for all governmental bodies and agencies. The system is designed to provide policymakers in Washington, Chiefs of Missions (ambassadors), and military commanders with flexible tools to achieve integrated planning processes for unified strategic and implementation plans, joint interagency field deployments, and a joint civilian operations capability. "The system is likely to be activated when a crisis in a foreign nation or region is of sufficient importance that it directly impacts on US national interest or is likely to do so" (USJFCOM 2010: I-7).

The IMS works on three levels. The highest political-strategic level is represented by the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) which is based in Washington and is composed of the interagency decision-making body, supported by a full-time interagency Secretariat that performs planning and operations functions and mobilises resources. The CRSG is co-chaired by the Regional Assistant Secretary of State for the country in question, the S/CRS Coordinator, and the appropriate National Security Council Senior Director (USJFCOM 2010: II-2-II-3 or[10]).

The middle level is represented by the Integrating Planning Cell (IPC). The Cell consists of interagency planners and regional and sectoral experts who are deployed to the relevant Geographic Combatant Command or multinational headquarters to assist in harmonising ongoing planning and operations between

---

[9]   US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization: http://www.state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm (June 28, 2011).

[10]   US Department of State: http://www.state.gov/s/crs/66427.htm (September 23, 2011).

civilian and military agencies and/or the USG and multinational headquarters (USJFCOM 2010: II-3 or [11]).

The lowest level is represented by the Advance Civilian Team (ACT). The team supports the Chief of Missions in the field to develop, execute, and monitor plans. The ACT provides interagency field management, deployment, and logistics capabilities, developing and implementing activities through regional field teams. ACT is also responsible for the deployment of Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs), an analogue of Provincial Reconstruction Teams[12], which directly realise projects in the field (USJFCOM 2010: II-4).

The military forces are then present in all forms, on all levels and by various governmental institutions.

To financially cover the projects combining security and development activities the Stabilization and Reconstruction Fund has been established. The Fund and also other resources for stabilisation and reconstruction activities are concentrated in the hands of USAID and enable the financing of quick impact projects, of the counter-insurgency operations connected with projects to "win the hearts and minds" of local communities and the training of local police and national armed forces. The particular agencies and departments also have their own additional budgets to finance stabilisation and reconstruction operations individually and separately.

Despite this fact no extensive pooling of resources has been realised in the US up to now. The pooling of resources as a *sui generis* model is today used by two US allies, namely Canada and Great Britain. The pooled budgets are used for financing integrated projects representing development and security issues such as demining, security sector reform, reform or establishment of counterterrorist legislation etc. But the USG also discusses such a model and prepares steps to introduce the first integrated budget including the inter-agency financial mechanism for the Department of Defense, State Department and USAID (Serafino 2011: 2).

After the establishment of the S/CRS the relationship between the Department of Defense and State Department on the one side and USAID on the other side has also changed. Congress temporarily rearranged the mandate of the Department of Defense to enable the Department to assist other governmental bodies and departments to get over the gap by the deployment of civilian

---

[11]   Ibid
[12]   FACTs originated from the lessons learned from Iraqi and Afghani Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and are similar to PRTs.

missions (Nash and Knudsen undated: 13). In 2011, Section 1207 of *the National Defense Authorization Act* for the fiscal year 2006 expired, which provided authority for the Department of Defense to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilisation, and security activities in foreign countries (Serafino 2010: 1 and Serafino 2011).

Lessons learned from the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan led also to the transformation of US military forces. Civil-military cooperation and training has been strengthened and the integration of civilians into military structures has been made possible. The strengthening of civil-military cooperation is based on the *National Defense Strategy* from spring 2005, which explicitly makes reference to civil-military cooperation in the war against the *enemy* (The *National Defense Strategy of The United States of America* 2005). The US army should newly carry out tasks such as the provision of essential services and the building of critical infrastructure, support of governance, elections and free media, support of the rule of law and the reform of the security sector. The US army also prepares, within the framework of Interagency Management System, the joint doctrine which is planned to work as an interagency doctrine for the coordination of operations and improvement of the efficiency of military forces by the carrying out of civilian tasks (USJFCOM 2010: ii-iii).

After 2001 significant organisational and institutional changes inside of USAID and in the relations between USAID and other ministries and cooperating agencies also took place. The starting point for this transformation was the *National Security Strategy 2002* (NSS 2002) which for the first time in US history declared that development was to become, beside diplomacy and defense, the third pillar of US national security. According to the NSS 2002, USAID will, under the supervision of the State Department, redefine its strategic priorities and transform its methods. USAID prepared as a reaction to the NSS 2002 a new programmatic document named *Foreign Aid in the National Interest. Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*. The report openly declares that "foreign assistance will be a key instrument of foreign policy in the coming decades" (USAID 2002: iv) and it will be used to secure US national interest (USAID 2002: iv ff).

Following the 2002 report the organisational and budgetary changes moved forward. The milestones for the transformation of USAID's role and position have been the establishment of the S/CRS, acceptance of the NSPD-44 and

Section 1207 of *National Defense Authorization Act* (both see above). In February 2009 the Office for Civilian Response was established within USAID on the basis of the NSPD-44. The role of the office is to supervise the training, equipment and deployment of civilian experts' rapid response teams under the framework of integrated operational system of the stabilisation and reconstruction operations in failing and failed states. [13] USAID emerged as the important agent of civil-military relations. Under the heading of "foreign assistance" USAID provided military material, training and services to foreign states. In 2009, to replace Section 1207 of the NDAA, the Complex Crisis Fund was established. In the fiscal year 2010, finance for the Fund was first provided by Congress in an effort to regularise funding previously received through transfers from the Department of Defense under the authority of Section 1207. Managed by USAID, this fund supports activities to prevent or respond to emerging or unforeseen crises that address security or stabilisation needs. The fund is planed to target countries or regions that demonstrate a high or escalating risk of conflict, instability, or an unanticipated opportunity for progress in a newly-emerging or fragile democracy (Serafino 2009: 6 and Department of State 2011: 96).

The agents of American security governance are mainly the US government and particular ministries, US armed forces and USG civilian agencies. An important role is also played by US allies, coalition partners, international organisations such as the UN, NATO or the EU and, finally, non-governmental organisations. If agreed, the security governance agent can also be from the private sector.

Various actors intervene into security governance on different levels. Non-governmental organisations cooperate with FACTs or with PRTs, play a significant role as the part of the early warning system, are partners of USAID and of the State Department and work as security governance system experts. Civilian experts from NGOs should also be part of the response readiness corps, a civilian rapid response body subordinated to the S/CRS. The coalition partners participate on collective stabilisation and reconstruction missions, and coordinate their activities with Geographic Combatant Commands. International organisations and US allies coordinate their planning and operational capacities with the US in order to work on their collective goal to harmonise stabilisation and reconstruction approaches. Even joint reconstruction funds (Trust Funds) have been created.

---

[13] USAID: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/civilianresponse/ (August 6, 2011).

Conclusions

Since 2001 the organisation and institutionalisation of the security policies of many countries has radically changed. The transformation is most obvious in the case of the United States of America. At the core of the change is the weakening of the understanding of security policy as a hierarchical policy with clear institutions, codified procedures and a chain of command. The traditional security policy has been replaced by a non-hierarchical policy with non-linear horizontal policy coordination based on less institutionalised forms of cooperation performed by multiple actors. The main reason for the change was the effort to stabilise and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan effectively which needed new approaches including a combination of security and development activities. Whilst at the beginning of 1990s it was the US army who was deployed in stabilisation and reconstruction operations and who had to secure US national interests, today there are civilian teams of USAID, rapid response teams of the State Department and interagency civilian teams who should protect the security of Americans. The US army and various DOD teams continue to be part of the security policy system but more or less only as one of many actors. The change has been reflected on the institutional, organisational as well as budgetary level.

To sum up, stabilisation and reconstruction policies became a central part of US security policy and opened the door for the emergence of security governance. The highest and central agent of US security governance is the President. The President acts as the arbiter between the civilian and military sectors. The managing centre of stabilisation and reconstruction policies is the Secretary of State with the support of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction and of the Secretary of Defense. Stabilisation and reconstruction policy has been institutionalised under the Interagency Management System. Within this system a number of activities have been integrated including the responsibilities of the State Department and particular embassies, of interagency bodies (on the planning as well as operational level), of the Department of Defense, military forces and the USAID development agency. Stabilisation and reconstruction operations are, in the new world environment, understood as a main instrument for ensuring US national security. The dominant responsibility lies on the State Department and USAID (newly subordinated to the State Department). On the operational level the task is performed by FACTs and PRTs.

Bibliography

Daase, Christopher and Cornelius Friesendorf: 2010. *Introduction: security governance and the problem of unintended consequences*. In Christopher Daase a Cornelius Friesendorf, Rethinking Security Governance. The problem of uninteded consequences. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 1-20.

Department of Defence USA: 2009. *Department of Defense Instruction Nr. 3000.05*, September 16, 2009 (http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf).

Department of Defence: 2005. *Department of Defense Directive Nr. 3000.05*, November 28, 2005 (http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/sss_1_080106_dod.pdf).

Department of State: 2011. *Foreign Operations. Congressional Budget Justification*. Volume 2. Fiscal Year 2012 (http://www.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/158267.pdf)

Ellner, Andrea: 2010. *Civil-Military Relations under Strain – A Comparative Analysis of Britain and the US*. Paper prepared for the 60th Anniversary Conference of the Political Studies Association and the British International Studies Association, Edinburgh, 29 March – 1 April 2010, PSA.

Hänggi, Heiner: 2005. *Approchaing Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective*, in Alan Bryden a Heiner Hänggi (eds.), Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Münster: Lit, pp. 3-19.

Howell, Jude and Jeremy Lind: 2009. Changing Donor Policy and Practice in Civil Society in the Post-9/11 Aid Context. *Third World Quarterly*, 30, 7, 2009, pp. 1279-1296.

Kavalski, Emilian: 2009. Timescapes of security: clocks, clouds, and the complexity of security governance. *World Futures*, 65, pp. 527-551.

Keohane, Robert O.: 2002. *Power and interdependence in partially globalized world*. Routledge.

Kirchener, E. J.: 2006. The Challenge of European Union Security Governance. JCMS: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44, pp. 947-968.

Meernik, James; Eric L. Krueger and Steven C. Poe: 1998. Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War. *The Journal of Politics* 60, 1, pp. 63-85.

Moss, Todd, David Roodman and Scott Standely: 2005. *The Global War on Terror and U.S. Development Assistance: USAID allocation by country,*

1998-2005. Working Paper Number 62, Center for Global Development, July 2005.

Nash, William L. a Ciara Knudsen: undated, *Reform and Innovation in Stabilization, Reconstruction and Development*. Princeton Project on National Security: http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/papers/reconstruction.pdf.

National Defence Strategy of The United States of America, March 2005: http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf.

Rosenau, James N.: 1992. *Governance, order, and change in world politics*. In James N. Rosenau a Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge Studies in Internnational Relations, Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-29.

Schneckener, Ulrich: 2006. *Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance*, in Alan Bryden et al, Private Actors and Security Governance, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Geneva, pp. 23-41.

Serafino, Nina M.: 2009. *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transition: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*. CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Research Service.

Serafino, Nina M.: 2010. *Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns*. CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Research Service (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA514174).

Serafino, Nina M.: 2011. *Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206." Background and issues for Congress*. CRS Report for Congress: Congressional Research Service.